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<title>Center squeeze</title>

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Center squeeze

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</style><table class="sidebar sidebar-collapse nomobile nowraplinks"><tbody><tr><td class="sidebar-pretitle">A joint <a href="Portal%3APolitics" title="Portal:Politics">Politics</a> and <a href="Portal%3AEconomics" title="Portal:Economics">Economics</a> series</td></tr><tr><th class="sidebar-title-with-pretitle" style="border-top:1px #fafafa solid; border-bottom:1px #fafafa solid; background:#efefef; background: var(--background-color-interactive, #efefef); color: var(--color-base, #000); padding:0.2em;"><a href="Social_choice_theory" title="Social choice theory">Social choice</a> and <a href="Electoral_system" title="Electoral system">electoral systems</a></th></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-image"></td></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-above">

<div class="hlist"><ul><li><a href="Social_choice_theory" title="Social choice theory">Social choice</a></li><li><a href="Mechanism_design" title="Mechanism design">Mechanism design</a></li><li><a href="Comparative_politics" title="Comparative politics">Comparative politics</a></li><li><a href="Comparison_of_voting_rules" title="Comparison of voting rules">Comparison</a></li><li><a href="List_of_electoral_systems" title="List of electoral systems">List</a> (<a href="List_of_electoral_systems_by_country" title="List of electoral systems by country">By country</a>)</li></ul></div></td></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align:left;">

<div class="sidebar-list mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"><div class="sidebar-list-title" style="background:#efefef; border-top:1px solid;background: var(--background-color-interactive, #efefef); color: var(--color-base, #000);;color: var(--color-base)"><a href="Single-member_district" title="Single-member district">Single-winner methods</a></div><div class="sidebar-list-content mw-collapsible-content">Single vote – <a href="Plurality_voting" title="Plurality voting">plurality</a> methods

<ul><li><a href="First-past-the-post_voting" title="First-past-the-post voting">First preference plurality (FPP)</a></li>

<li><a href="Two-round_system" title="Two-round system">Two-round</a> (<abbr style="font-size:85%" title=""><a href="American_English" title="American English">US</a>:</abbr> <a href="Nonpartisan_primary" title="Nonpartisan primary">Jungle primary</a>)

<ul><li><a href="Partisan_primary" class="mw-redirect" title="Partisan primary">Partisan primary</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Instant-runoff_voting" title="Instant-runoff voting">Instant-runoff</a>

<ul><li><abbr style="font-size:85%" title=""><a href="British_English" title="British English">UK</a>:</abbr> Alternative vote (AV)</li>

<li><abbr style="font-size:85%" title=""><a href="American_English" title="American English">US</a>:</abbr> Ranked-choice (RCV)</li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Party_block_voting" class="mw-redirect" title="Party block voting">Party block voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Plurality_block_voting" title="Plurality block voting">Plurality block voting</a></li></ul>

<hr>

<a href="Condorcet_method" title="Condorcet method">Condorcet methods</a>

<ul><li><a href="Tideman_alternative_method" title="Tideman alternative method">Condorcet-IRV</a></li>

<li><a href="Round-robin_voting" title="Round-robin voting">Round-robin voting</a>

<ul><li><a href="Minimax_Condorcet_method" title="Minimax Condorcet method">Minimax</a></li>

<li><a href="Kemeny_method" title="Kemeny method">Kemeny</a></li>

<li><a href="Schulze_method" title="Schulze method">Schulze</a></li>

<li><a href="Ranked_pairs" title="Ranked pairs">Ranked pairs</a></li>

<li><a href="Maximal_lottery" class="mw-redirect" title="Maximal lottery">Maximal lottery</a></li></ul></li></ul>

<hr>

<a href="Positional_voting" title="Positional voting">Positional voting</a>

<ul><li><a href="First-preference_plurality" class="mw-redirect" title="First-preference plurality">Plurality</a> (<abbr style="font-size:85%" title=""><a href="Sequential_elimination_method" title="Sequential elimination method">el.</a></abbr> <a href="Instant-runoff_voting" title="Instant-runoff voting">IRV</a>)</li>

<li><a href="Borda_count" title="Borda count">Borda count</a> (<abbr style="font-size:85%" title=""><a href="Sequential_elimination_method" title="Sequential elimination method">el.</a></abbr> <a href="Baldwin's_method" class="mw-redirect" title="Baldwin's method">Baldwin</a>, <abbr style="font-size:85%" title=""><a href="Highest_median_voting_rules" title="Highest median voting rules">Mdn.</a></abbr> <a href="Bucklin_voting" title="Bucklin voting">Bucklin</a>)</li>

<li><a href="Anti-plurality_voting" title="Anti-plurality voting">Antiplurality</a> (<abbr style="font-size:85%" title=""><a href="Sequential_elimination_method" title="Sequential elimination method">el.</a></abbr> <a href="Coombs_method" class="mw-redirect" title="Coombs method">Coombs</a>)</li></ul>

<hr>

<a href="Rated_voting" title="Rated voting">Cardinal voting</a>

<ul><li><a href="Score_voting" title="Score voting">Score voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Approval_voting" title="Approval voting">Approval voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Highest_median_voting_rules" title="Highest median voting rules">Majority judgment</a></li>

<li><a href="STAR_voting" title="STAR voting">STAR voting</a></li></ul></div></div></td>

</tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align:left;">

<div class="sidebar-list mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"><div class="sidebar-list-title" style="background:#efefef; border-top:1px solid;background: var(--background-color-interactive, #efefef); color: var(--color-base, #000);;color: var(--color-base)"><a href="Proportional_representation" title="Proportional representation">Proportional representation</a></div><div class="sidebar-list-content mw-collapsible-content"><a href="Party-list_proportional_representation" title="Party-list proportional representation">Party-list</a>

<ul><li><a href="Apportionment_(politics)" title="Apportionment (politics)">Apportionment</a>

<ul><li><a href="Highest_averages_method" title="Highest averages method">Highest averages</a></li>

<li><a href="Largest_remainder_method" class="mw-redirect" title="Largest remainder method">Largest remainders</a></li>

<li><a href="National_remnant" title="National remnant">National remnant</a></li>

<li><a href="Biproportional_apportionment" title="Biproportional apportionment">Biproportional</a></li></ul></li>

<ul><li><a href="Closed_list" title="Closed list">Closed list</a></li>

<li><a href="Panachage" title="Panachage">Panachage</a></li>

<li><a href="Localized_list" title="Localized list">Localized list</a></li></ul></li></ul>

<hr>

<a href="Electoral_quota" title="Electoral quota">Quota-remainder methods</a>

<li><a href="Schulze_STV" title="Schulze STV">Schulze STV</a></li>

<li><a href="Quota_Borda_system" title="Quota Borda system">Quota Borda</a></li></ul>

<hr>

<a href="Approval-based_committee" class="mw-redirect" title="Approval-based committee">Approval-based committees</a>

<ul><li><a href="Proportional_approval_voting" title="Proportional approval voting">Thiele's method</a></li>

<li><a href="Phragmen's_voting_rules" title="Phragmen's voting rules">Phragmen's method</a></li>

<li><a href="Expanding_approvals_rule" title="Expanding approvals rule">Expanding approvals rule</a></li>

<li><a href="Method_of_equal_shares" title="Method of equal shares">Method of equal shares</a></li></ul>

<hr>

<a href="Fractional_social_choice" title="Fractional social choice">Fractional social choice</a>

<ul><li><a href="Direct_representation" title="Direct representation">Direct representation</a>

<ul><li><a href="Interactive_representation" title="Interactive representation">Interactive representation</a></li>

<li><a href="Liquid_democracy" title="Liquid democracy">Liquid democracy</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Fractional_approval_voting" title="Fractional approval voting">Fractional approval voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Maximal_lottery" class="mw-redirect" title="Maximal lottery">Maximal lottery</a></li>

<li><a href="Random_ballot" title="Random ballot">Random ballot</a></li></ul>

<hr>

<a href="Semi-proportional_representation" title="Semi-proportional representation">Semi-proportional representation</a>

<ul><li><a href="Cumulative_voting" title="Cumulative voting">Cumulative</a>

<li><a href="Limited_voting" title="Limited voting">Limited voting</a></li></ul></div></div></td>

</tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align:left;">

<div class="sidebar-list mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"><div class="sidebar-list-title" style="background:#efefef; border-top:1px solid;background: var(--background-color-interactive, #efefef); color: var(--color-base, #000);;color: var(--color-base)"><a href="Mixed_electoral_system" title="Mixed electoral system">Mixed systems</a></div><div class="sidebar-list-content mw-collapsible-content">By results of combination

<ul><li><a href="Mixed-member_majoritarian_representation" title="Mixed-member majoritarian representation">Mixed-member majoritarian</a></li>

<li><a href="Mixed-member_proportional_representation" title="Mixed-member proportional representation">Mixed-member proportional</a></li></ul>

<hr>By mechanism of combination

<ul><li>Non-<a href="Compensation_(electoral_systems)" title="Compensation (electoral systems)">compensatory</a>

<ul><li><a href="Parallel_voting" title="Parallel voting">Parallel (superposition)</a></li>

<li><a href="Coexistence_(electoral_systems)" title="Coexistence (electoral systems)">Coexistence</a></li>

<li>Conditional</li>

<li><a href="Majority_bonus_system" title="Majority bonus system">Fusion (majority bonus)</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Compensation_(electoral_systems)" title="Compensation (electoral systems)">Compensatory</a>

<ul><li>Seat linkage system

<li><a href="Vote_linkage_mixed_system" class="mw-redirect" title="Vote linkage mixed system">Vote linkage system</a>

<ul><li><a href="Scorporo" title="Scorporo">Negative vote transfer</a></li>

<li><a href="Mixed_ballot_transferable_vote" title="Mixed ballot transferable vote">Mixed ballot</a></li></ul></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Mixed_electoral_system" title="Mixed electoral system">Supermixed systems</a>

<ul><li><a href="Dual-member_proportional_representation" class="mw-redirect" title="Dual-member proportional representation">Dual-member proportional</a></li>

<li><a href="Rural%E2%80%93urban_proportional_representation" title="Rural–urban proportional representation">Rural–urban proportional</a></li>

<li><a href="Majority_jackpot_system" title="Majority jackpot system">Majority jackpot</a></li></ul></li></ul>

<hr>

By ballot type

<ul><li><a href="Mixed_single_vote" title="Mixed single vote">Single vote</a>

<ul><li><a href="Double_simultaneous_vote" title="Double simultaneous vote">Double simultaneous vote</a></li></ul></li>

</tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align:left;">

<div class="sidebar-list mw-collapsible"><div class="sidebar-list-title" style="background:#efefef; border-top:1px solid;background: var(--background-color-interactive, #efefef); color: var(--color-base, #000);;color: var(--color-base)"><a href="Pathological_(mathematics)#Voting" title="Pathological (mathematics)">Paradoxes and pathologies</a></div><div class="sidebar-list-content mw-collapsible-content">Spoiler effects

<ul><li><a href="Spoiler_effect" title="Spoiler effect">Spoiler effect</a></li>

<li><a href="Independence_of_clones" class="mw-redirect" title="Independence of clones">Cloning paradox</a></li>

<li><a href="Condorcet_winner_criterion" title="Condorcet winner criterion">Frustrated majorities paradox</a></li>

</ul>

<hr>

Pathological response

<ul><li><a href="Perverse_response" class="mw-redirect" title="Perverse response">Perverse response</a></li>

<li><a href="Best-is-worst_paradox" class="mw-redirect" title="Best-is-worst paradox">Best-is-worst paradox</a></li>

<li><a href="No-show_paradox" class="mw-redirect" title="No-show paradox">No-show paradox</a></li>

<li><a href="Multiple_districts_paradox" class="mw-redirect" title="Multiple districts paradox">Multiple districts paradox</a></li></ul>

<hr>

<a href="Strategic_voting" title="Strategic voting">Strategic voting</a>

<ul><li><a href="Sincere_favorite_criterion" title="Sincere favorite criterion">Lesser evil voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Strategic_voting#Exaggeration" title="Strategic voting">Exaggeration</a></li>

<li><a href="Truncation_(voting)" class="mw-redirect" title="Truncation (voting)">Truncation</a></li>

<li><a href="Turkey-raising" class="mw-redirect" title="Turkey-raising">Turkey-raising</a></li>

<li><a href="Wasted_vote" title="Wasted vote">Wasted vote</a></li></ul>

<hr>

Paradoxes of <a href="Majority_rule" title="Majority rule">majority rule</a>

<ul><li><a href="Tyranny_of_the_majority" title="Tyranny of the majority">Tyranny of the majority</a></li>

<li><a href="Discursive_dilemma" class="mw-redirect" title="Discursive dilemma">Discursive dilemma</a></li>

<li><a href="Condorcet_paradox" title="Condorcet paradox">Conflicting majorities paradox</a></li></ul></div></div></td>

</tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align:left;">

<div class="sidebar-list mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"><div class="sidebar-list-title" style="background:#efefef; border-top:1px solid;background: var(--background-color-interactive, #efefef); color: var(--color-base, #000);;color: var(--color-base)"><a href="Social_choice_theory" title="Social choice theory">Social and collective choice</a></div><div class="sidebar-list-content mw-collapsible-content"><a href="Proof_of_impossibility" title="Proof of impossibility">Impossibility theorems</a>

<ul><li><a href="Arrow's_impossibility_theorem" title="Arrow's impossibility theorem">Arrow's theorem</a></li>

<li><a href="Condorcet_paradox" title="Condorcet paradox">Majority impossibility</a></li>

<li><a href="Moulin's_impossibility_theorem" class="mw-redirect" title="Moulin's impossibility theorem">Moulin's impossibility theorem</a></li>

<li><a href="McKelvey%E2%80%93Schofield_chaos_theorem" title="McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem">McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem</a></li>

<li><a href="Gibbard's_theorem" title="Gibbard's theorem">Gibbard's theorem</a></li></ul>

<hr>

Positive results

<ul><li><a href="Median_voter_theorem" title="Median voter theorem">Median voter theorem</a></li>

<li><a href="Condorcet's_jury_theorem" title="Condorcet's jury theorem">Condorcet's jury theorem</a></li>

<li><a href="May's_theorem" title="May's theorem">May's theorem</a></li>

<li><a href="Arrow's_theorem" class="mw-redirect" title="Arrow's theorem">Condorcet dominance theorems</a></li>

<li>Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem</li>

<li><a href="Vickrey-Clarke-Groves_mechanism" class="mw-redirect" title="Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism">VCG mechanism</a></li>

<li><a href="Quadratic_voting" title="Quadratic voting">Quadratic voting</a></li></ul></div></div></td>

</tr><tr><td class="sidebar-below" style="background: var(--background-color-interactive, #efefef); color: inherit; padding-top:0.2em;">

<div class="hlist"><ul><li> <a href="Portal%3APolitics" title="Portal:Politics">Politics portal</a></li><li> <a href="Portal%3AEconomics" title="Portal:Economics">Economics portal</a></li></ul></div> <a href="Portal%3AMathematics" title="Portal:Mathematics">Mathematics portal</a></td></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-navbar"><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1239400231">

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</style></td></tr></tbody></table>

A center squeeze is a kind of <a href="Spoiler_effect" title="Spoiler effect">spoiler effect</a> shared by rules like the <a href="Two-round_system" title="Two-round system">two-round system</a>, <a href="Plurality-with-primaries" class="mw-redirect" title="Plurality-with-primaries">plurality-with-primaries</a>, and <a href="Instant-runoff_voting" title="Instant-runoff voting">ranked choice voting</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Merril_198522422232-1">[1]</a> In a center squeeze, the <a href="Majority-preferred_candidate" class="mw-redirect" title="Majority-preferred candidate">majority-preferred</a> and <a href="Social_utility_efficiency" title="Social utility efficiency">socially optimal</a> candidate is eliminated in favor of a more <a href="Extremism" title="Extremism">extreme</a> alternative before having a chance to face another candidate in a one-on-one race.<a href="#cite_note-Merrill_19842223-2">[2]</a><a href="#cite_note-:0322232-3">[3]</a> Systems with center-squeeze are sometimes called centrifugal ("center-fleeing") because they encourage <a href="Political_polarization" title="Political polarization">political polarization</a>.<a href="#cite_note-4">[4]</a>

Candidates focused on appealing to a small <a href="Political_base" title="Political base">base</a> of <a href="Core_support" class="mw-redirect" title="Core support">core supporters</a> can "squeeze" broadly-popular candidates trapped between them out of the race, by splitting the <a href="First-preference_votes" class="mw-redirect" title="First-preference votes">first-round vote</a> needed to survive earlier rounds.<a href="#cite_note-Merril_198522422232-1">[1]</a><a href="#cite_note-:8522222-5">[5]</a><a href="#cite_note-:2322-6">[6]</a> This effect was first predicted by <a href="Social_choice_theory" title="Social choice theory">social choice theorists</a> in the 1940s and 50s, and has since been documented in various countries using <a href="Plurality-rule_family" class="mw-redirect" title="Plurality-rule family">plurality-style electoral systems</a>.

Famous examples of center squeezes include the <a href="2022_Alaska's_at-large_congressional_district_special_election" title="2022 Alaska's at-large congressional district special election">Alaska's 2022 special election</a> (where <a href="Nick_Begich_III" title="Nick Begich III">Nick Begich III</a> was eliminated in the first round by <a href="Sarah_Palin" title="Sarah Palin">Sarah Palin</a>)<a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a> as well as the <a href="2007_French_presidential_election" title="2007 French presidential election">2007 French presidential election</a>, where moderate liberal <a href="Fran%C3%A7ois_Bayrou" title="François Bayrou">François Bayrou</a> was eliminated by left-populist <a href="S%C3%A9gol%C3%A8ne_Royal" title="Ségolène Royal">Ségolène Royal</a>, allowing the right-wing <a href="Nicolas_Sarkozy" title="Nicolas Sarkozy">Nicolas Sarkozy</a> to win the second round.<a href="#cite_note-8">[8]</a><a href="#cite_note-9">[9]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Overview">Overview</h2></div>

Center squeezes are a kind of <a href="Spoiler_effect" title="Spoiler effect">spoiler effect</a> in which the majority-preferred candidate is eliminated before the final round of an election.<a href="#cite_note-:152223-10">[10]</a><a href="#cite_note-:032223-11">[11]</a> Candidates focused on appealing to a small <a href="Political_base" title="Political base">base</a> of <a href="Core_support" class="mw-redirect" title="Core support">core supporters</a> can squeeze Condorcet winners out of the race, by splitting the <a href="First-preference_votes" class="mw-redirect" title="First-preference votes">first-round vote</a> needed to survive earlier rounds.<a href="#cite_note-Merril_19852242223-12">[12]</a><a href="#cite_note-:852223-13">[13]</a>

By <a href="Median_voter_theorem" title="Median voter theorem">Black's median-voter theorem</a>, the candidate who appeals most to the median voter will be the <a href="Majority-preferred_candidate" class="mw-redirect" title="Majority-preferred candidate">majority-preferred candidate</a>, which means they will be elected by <a href="Condorcet_method" title="Condorcet method">any method compatible with majority-rule</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Merril_198522422232-1">[1]</a><a href="#cite_note-:152223-10">[10]</a> However, in methods that strongly prioritize first preferences, these candidates are often eliminated early on because they aim for broad appeal rather than strong <a href="Political_base" title="Political base">base support</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Merril_198522422232-1">[1]</a><a href="#cite_note-Ogren_102799223-14">[14]</a><a href="#cite_note-Lewyn_20122232223-15">[15]</a>

The "center" in "center squeeze" refers to candidates who are close to the center of public opinion, and is not limited to <a href="Centrism" title="Centrism">centrists</a> along a traditional, one-dimensional <a href="Political_spectrum" title="Political spectrum">political spectrum</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Davis_197022232-16">[16]</a> A center squeeze can occur in any situation where voters prefer candidates <a href="Single_peaked_preferences" title="Single peaked preferences">who hold views similar to their own</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Lewyn_20122232223-15">[15]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Indirect_effects">Indirect effects</h3></div>

Voting systems that suffer from the center-squeeze effect incentivize candidates to avoid the political center,<a href="#cite_note-:852223-13">[13]</a><a href="#cite_note-:242223-17">[17]</a><a href="#cite_note-Ogren_102799223-14">[14]</a> creating political polarization in the long run.<a href="#cite_note-:242223-17">[17]</a><a href="#cite_note-Ogren_102799223-14">[14]</a><a href="#cite_note-:152223-10">[10]</a> As a result, rules like RCV can lead to polarization even if center squeezes seem empirically rare, because the electoral system provides few incentives encouraging moderates to run for office in the first place.<a href="#cite_note-:242223-17">[17]</a><a href="#cite_note-Ogren_102799223-14">[14]</a><a href="#cite_note-18">[18]</a>

Center-squeeze has been observed in <a href="Australia" title="Australia">Australia</a>,<a href="#cite_note-:2223222-19">[19]</a><a href="#cite_note-20">[20]</a><a href="#cite_note-21">[21]</a> <a href="Maine" title="Maine">Maine</a>,<a href="#cite_note-22">[22]</a> <a href="Fiji" title="Fiji">Fiji</a>,<a href="#cite_note-23">[23]</a><a href="#cite_note-:33222-24">[24]</a> and various <a href="United_States" title="United States">US</a> cities,<a href="#cite_note-25">[25]</a> all of which use <a href="Ranked-choice_voting" title="Ranked-choice voting">ranked-choice voting</a>, in addition to <a href="California" title="California">California</a> (which uses <a href="Nonpartisan_primaries" class="mw-redirect" title="Nonpartisan primaries">nonpartisan primaries</a>).<a href="#cite_note-26">[26]</a><a href="#cite_note-:2322232222-27">[27]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Susceptibility_by_system">Susceptibility by system</h3></div>

Center squeeze is a major feature of two-party systems using <a href="Primary_election" title="Primary election">primaries</a> or other multiple-round systems.<a href="#cite_note-Merril_19852242223-12">[12]</a> In these methods, candidates must focus on appealing to their <a href="Core_support" class="mw-redirect" title="Core support">core supporters</a> to ensure they can make it past the first round, where only first-preferences count.<a href="#cite_note-Merril_19852242223-12">[12]</a>

If voters assign scores to candidates based on ideological distance, <a href="Score_voting" title="Score voting">score voting</a> will always select the candidate closest to some <a href="Central_tendency" title="Central tendency">central tendency</a> of the voter distribution. As a result, while score voting does not always elect the candidate closest to the median voter, it often behaves like methods that do.<a href="#cite_note-:12-28">[28]</a><a href="#cite_note-:0-29">[29]</a> Under most models of strategic voting, <a href="Spoilerproof" class="mw-redirect" title="Spoilerproof">spoilerproof</a> cardinal methods tend to behave like <a href="Approval_voting" title="Approval voting">approval voting</a> and thus converge on the Condorcet winner.<a href="#cite_note-:0223-30">[30]</a><a href="#cite_note-Handbook_on_Approval_Voting23-31">[31]</a><a href="#cite_note-:1223-32">[32]</a><a href="#cite_note-:22-33">[33]</a>

The opposite situation—a bias in favor of bland, inoffensive, or unknown candidates—is not common in any widely-used voting rules. However, it can occur for "negative" voting methods that choose candidates with the least opposition, like <a href="Anti-plurality_voting" title="Anti-plurality voting">anti-plurality</a>, <a href="D21_%E2%80%93_Jane%C4%8Dek_method" title="D21 – Janeček method">D21 – Janeček</a>, or <a href="Coombs'_method" title="Coombs' method">Coombs' method</a>.<a href="#cite_note-34">[34]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Example">Example</h2></div>

In Alphabet Land, voters are divided based on how names should be arranged on lists. <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle A}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle A}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./7daff47fa58cdfd29dc333def748ff5fa4c923e3.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.743ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle A}" loading="lazy"> thinks names should always be in alphabetical order; <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle Z}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle Z}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./1cc6b75e09a8aa3f04d8584b11db534f88fb56bd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.68ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle Z}" loading="lazy"> thinks they should be in reverse-alphabetical order; and <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle M}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle M}</annotation>

</semantics>

Because <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle M}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle M}</annotation>

</semantics>

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle A}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./7daff47fa58cdfd29dc333def748ff5fa4c923e3.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.743ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle A}" loading="lazy"> and <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle Z}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle Z}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./1cc6b75e09a8aa3f04d8584b11db534f88fb56bd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.68ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle Z}" loading="lazy"> in head-to-head match-ups, <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle M}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle M}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./f82cade9898ced02fdd08712e5f0c0151758a0dd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:2.442ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle M}" loading="lazy"> is the <a href="Condorcet_winner" class="mw-redirect" title="Condorcet winner">majority-preferred (Condorcet) winner</a>. <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle M}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle M}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./f82cade9898ced02fdd08712e5f0c0151758a0dd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:2.442ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle M}" loading="lazy"> is the <a href="Socially_optimal_winner" class="mw-redirect" title="Socially optimal winner">socially-optimal winner</a> as well.<a href="#cite_note-:0-29">[29]</a> Thus, <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle M}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle M}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./f82cade9898ced02fdd08712e5f0c0151758a0dd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:2.442ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle M}" loading="lazy"> is the "best" or "most popular" candidate under both common metrics of candidate quality in <a href="Social_choice" class="mw-redirect" title="Social choice">social choice</a>.<a href="#cite_note-:152223-10">[10]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="First-preference_plurality_(FPP)">First-preference plurality (FPP)</h3></div>

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle Z}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./1cc6b75e09a8aa3f04d8584b11db534f88fb56bd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.68ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle Z}" loading="lazy"> wins under a single-round of FPP, with 35.9% of voters choosing them as their favorite. However, over substantially more voters considered <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle Z}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle Z}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./1cc6b75e09a8aa3f04d8584b11db534f88fb56bd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.68ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle Z}" loading="lazy"> to be their least favorite, with 63.1% of voters preferring <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle M}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle M}</annotation>

</semantics>

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle Z}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./1cc6b75e09a8aa3f04d8584b11db534f88fb56bd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.68ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle Z}" loading="lazy"> is elected, despite an overwhelming two-thirds majority preferring <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle M}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle M}</annotation>

</semantics>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Ranked-choice_runoff_(Alternative,_Two-round)">Ranked-choice runoff (Alternative, Two-round)</h3></div>

<a href="Instant-runoff_voting" title="Instant-runoff voting">Ranked-choice voting (RCV)</a> tries to address vote-splitting in FPP by replacing it with a series of FPP elections, with the loser being eliminated in each round.<a href="#cite_note-35">[35]</a><a href="#cite_note-36">[36]</a>

The first round of the election is the same as the FPP election. <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle M}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle M}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./f82cade9898ced02fdd08712e5f0c0151758a0dd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:2.442ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle M}" loading="lazy"> has the least <a href="First-preference_votes" class="mw-redirect" title="First-preference votes">first preferences</a> and is therefore eliminated. Their votes are reassigned to <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle A}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle A}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./7daff47fa58cdfd29dc333def748ff5fa4c923e3.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.743ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle A}" loading="lazy"> and <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle Z}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle Z}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./1cc6b75e09a8aa3f04d8584b11db534f88fb56bd.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.68ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle Z}" loading="lazy">, according to their ballot. In the second round, enough voters who preferred <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle M}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle M}</annotation>

</semantics>

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle A}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./7daff47fa58cdfd29dc333def748ff5fa4c923e3.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.743ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle A}" loading="lazy"> as their second choice and <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" alttext="{\displaystyle A}">

</mstyle>

</mrow>

<annotation encoding="application/x-tex">{\displaystyle A}</annotation>

</semantics>

</math><img src="./7daff47fa58cdfd29dc333def748ff5fa4c923e3.svg" class="mwe-math-fallback-image-inline mw-invert skin-invert" aria-hidden="true" style="vertical-align: -0.338ex; width:1.743ex; height:2.176ex;" alt="{\displaystyle A}" loading="lazy"> wins the election. RCV thus fails to have a substantial moderating impact, instead causing only a swing from one extreme to the other.<a href="#cite_note-37">[37]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Real-world_occurrences">Real-world occurrences</h2></div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="2007_French_presidential_election">2007 French presidential election</h3></div>

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</style><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="2007_French_presidential_election" title="2007 French presidential election">2007 French presidential election</a></div>

The <a href="2007_French_presidential_election" title="2007 French presidential election">2007 French presidential election</a> was seen as an example of a center squeeze. The second round saw <a href="Nicolas_Sarkozy" title="Nicolas Sarkozy">Nicolas Sarkozy</a>, a conservative, face off against <a href="S%C3%A9gol%C3%A8ne_Royal" title="Ségolène Royal">Ségolène Royal</a>, a socialist. Moderate liberal <a href="Fran%C3%A7ois_Bayrou" title="François Bayrou">François Bayrou</a> was eliminated in the first round, despite polls showing a majority of voters preferred Bayrou in a one-on-one match with either of his opponents.<a href="#cite_note-:4-38">[38]</a><a href="#cite_note-39">[39]</a><a href="#cite_note-40">[40]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="2022_Alaska_special_election">2022 Alaska special election</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="2022_Alaska's_at-large_congressional_district_special_election" title="2022 Alaska's at-large congressional district special election">2022 Alaska's at-large congressional district special election</a></div>

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</style><table class="infobox ib-election infobox-table"><caption class="infobox-title summary">Center squeeze</caption><tbody><tr><th colspan="2" class="infobox-header"><hr><a href="Alaska's_at-large_congressional_district" title="Alaska's at-large congressional district">Alaska's at-large congressional district</a></th></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="infobox-label">Turnout</th><td class="infobox-data">32.2%<a href="#cite_note-akdoe1-41">[41]</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="infobox-full-data">

<td>

</td>

</td>

</td>

</td></tr>

<tr>

<th style="width:75px;text-align:left">Candidate

</th>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center"><a href="Mary_Peltola" title="Mary Peltola">Mary Peltola</a>

</td>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center"><a href="Sarah_Palin" title="Sarah Palin">Sarah Palin</a>

</td>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center"><a href="Nick_Begich_III" title="Nick Begich III">Nick Begich III</a>

</td></tr>

<tr>

<th style="width:75px;text-align:left">Party

</th>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center"><a href="Democratic_Party_(United_States)" title="Democratic Party (United States)">Democratic</a>

</td>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center"><a href="Republican_Party_(United_States)" title="Republican Party (United States)">Republican</a>

</td>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center"><a href="Republican_Party_(United_States)" title="Republican Party (United States)">Republican</a>

</td></tr>

<tr>

<th style="width:75px;text-align:left">First round

</th>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center">74,817 39.7%

</td>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center">58,339 30.9%

</td>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center">52,536 27.8%

</td></tr>

<tr>

<th style="width:75px;text-align:left"><a href="Instant-runoff_voting" title="Instant-runoff voting">Final round</a>

</th>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center">91,266 51.5%

</td>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center">86,026 48.5%

</td>

<td style="width:75px;text-align:center">Eliminated

</td></tr>

</tbody></table></td></tr></tbody></table>

The <a href="2022_Alaska's_at-large_congressional_district_special_election" title="2022 Alaska's at-large congressional district special election">2022 Alaska special election</a> seat was seen as an example of a center squeeze, where <a href="Nick_Begich_III" title="Nick Begich III">Nick Begich III</a> was eliminated in the first round by <a href="Right-wing" class="mw-redirect" title="Right-wing">right-wing</a> spoiler <a href="Sarah_Palin" title="Sarah Palin">Sarah Palin</a>,<a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a><a href="#cite_note-:0222223-42">[42]</a> despite a majority of voters preferring Begich to either one of his opponents.<a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a><a href="#cite_note-easy_fix2223-43">[43]</a> The ranked-choice runoff election involved one <a href="Democratic_Party_(United_States)" title="Democratic Party (United States)">Democrat</a> (<a href="Mary_Peltola" title="Mary Peltola">Mary Peltola</a>) and two <a href="Republican_Party_(United_States)" title="Republican Party (United States)">Republicans</a> (<a href="Sarah_Palin" title="Sarah Palin">Sarah Palin</a> and <a href="Nick_Begich_III" title="Nick Begich III">Nick Begich III</a>). Because the full ballot data for the race was released, <a href="Social_choice_theory" title="Social choice theory">social choice theorists</a> were able to confirm that Palin spoiled the race for Begich, with Peltola winning the race as a result of several <a href="Pathological_(mathematics)" title="Pathological (mathematics)">counter-intuitive</a> behaviors that tend to characterize center-squeeze elections.<a href="#cite_note-easy_fix2223-43">[43]</a><a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a>

The election produced a winner opposed by a majority of voters, with a majority of voters ranking Begich above Peltola and Palin,<a href="#cite_note-:133-44">[44]</a><a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a><a href="#cite_note-:0222223-42">[42]</a> and more than half giving Peltola no support at all.<a href="#cite_note-:133-44">[44]</a><a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a> The election was also notable as a <a href="Participation_criterion" title="Participation criterion">no-show paradox</a>, where a candidate is eliminated as a result of votes cast in support of their candidacy. In this case, ballots ranking Palin first and Begich second instead allowed Peltola to win.<a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a><a href="#cite_note-:3223-45">[45]</a><a href="#cite_note-:0222223-42">[42]</a>

Many <a href="Social_choice_theory" title="Social choice theory">social choice theorists</a> criticized the ranked-choice runoff procedure for its <a href="Pathological_(mathematics)#In_voting" title="Pathological (mathematics)">pathological behavior</a>.<a href="#cite_note-easy_fix222223-46">[46]</a><a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a> Along with being a center squeeze, the election was a <a href="Monotonicity_criterion" class="mw-redirect" title="Monotonicity criterion">negative voting weight event</a>,<a href="#cite_note-:3223-45">[45]</a> where a voter's ballot has the opposite of its intended effect (e.g. where a candidate would need more votes to lose).<a href="#cite_note-:3223-45">[45]</a><a href="#cite_note-47">[47]</a> In this race, Peltola would have lost if she had received more support from Palin voters,<a href="#cite_note-48">[48]</a><a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a><a href="#cite_note-:133-44">[44]</a> and won as a result of 5,200 ballots that ranked her last (after Palin then Begich).<a href="#cite_note-:3223-45">[45]</a><a href="#cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">[7]</a> However, <a href="Social_choice_theory" title="Social choice theory">social choice theorists</a> were careful to note the results likely would have been the same under Alaska's previous primary system as well. This led several to recommend replacing the system with any one of several <a href="Comparison_of_electoral_systems" class="mw-redirect" title="Comparison of electoral systems">alternatives without these behaviors</a>, such as <a href="STAR_voting" title="STAR voting">STAR</a>, <a href="Approval_voting" title="Approval voting">approval</a>, or <a href="Condorcet_method" title="Condorcet method">Condorcet voting</a>.<a href="#cite_note-easy_fix2223-43">[43]</a><a href="#cite_note-:133-44">[44]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="2009_Burlington_mayoral_election">2009 Burlington mayoral election</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="2009_Burlington_mayoral_election" class="mw-redirect" title="2009 Burlington mayoral election">2009 Burlington mayoral election</a></div>

The <a href="2009_Burlington_mayoral_election" class="mw-redirect" title="2009 Burlington mayoral election">2009 Burlington mayoral election</a> was held in March 2009 for the city of <a href="Burlington%2C_Vermont" title="Burlington, Vermont">Burlington, Vermont</a>, and serves as an example of a four-candidate center squeeze. This was the second mayoral election since the city's 2005 change to <a href="Ranked-choice_voting" title="Ranked-choice voting">ranked-choice runoff voting</a>, after the <a href="2006_Burlington_mayoral_election" class="mw-redirect" title="2006 Burlington mayoral election">2006 mayoral election</a>.<a href="#cite_note-burlington_votes23-49">[49]</a> In the 2009 election, incumbent <a href="List_of_mayors_of_Burlington%2C_Vermont" title="List of mayors of Burlington, Vermont">Burlington mayor</a> <a href="Bob_Kiss" title="Bob Kiss">Bob Kiss</a> won reelection as a member of the <a href="Vermont_Progressive_Party" title="Vermont Progressive Party">Vermont Progressive Party</a>,<a href="#cite_note-50">[50]</a> defeating Kurt Wright in the final round with 48% of the vote.<a href="#cite_note-51">[51]</a>

The election results were criticized by <a href="Mathematicians" class="mw-redirect" title="Mathematicians">mathematicians</a> and <a href="Voting_theory" class="mw-redirect" title="Voting theory">voting theorists</a> for several <a href="Pathological_(mathematics)" title="Pathological (mathematics)">pathologies</a> associated with RCV. These included a <a href="No-show_paradox" class="mw-redirect" title="No-show paradox">no-show paradox</a>, where Kiss won only as a result of 750 votes ranking Kiss in last place.<a href="#cite_note-52">[52]</a><a href="#cite_note-:823-53">[53]</a><a href="#cite_note-Voting_Paradoxes23-54">[54]</a> Several <a href="Electoral_reform" title="Electoral reform">electoral reform</a> advocates branded the election a failure after Kiss was elected despite 54% of voters voting for Montroll over Kiss,<a href="#cite_note-ScoreVotingNet23-55">[55]</a><a href="#cite_note-:033-56">[56]</a> violating the <a href="Majority-rule_principle" class="mw-redirect" title="Majority-rule principle">majority-rule principle</a>.<a href="#cite_note-57">[57]</a><a href="#cite_note-Lewyn_p._122_note_19-58">[58]</a><a href="#cite_note-59">[59]</a> Later analyses showed the race was spoiled, with Wright pulling moderate votes away from Montroll, who would have beat Kiss in a one-on-one race.<a href="#cite_note-Lewyn_p._122_note_19-58">[58]</a><a href="#cite_note-Laatu_200923-60">[60]</a>

The controversy culminated in a successful 2010 <a href="Popular_initiative" title="Popular initiative">initiative</a> that repealed RCV by a vote of 52% to 48%,<a href="#cite_note-rutland_herald23-61">[61]</a><a href="#cite_note-BVT2010030223-62">[62]</a> a 16-point shift from the 64% who had supported the 2005 ratification.<a href="#cite_note-burlington_votes23-49">[49]</a> The results of every possible one-on-one election are as follows:

<th>Party

</th>

<th>Candidate

</th>

<th>vs. Simpson

</th>

<th>vs. Smith

</th>

<th>vs. Wright

</th>

<th>vs. Kiss

</th>

</th></tr>

<tr>

<th>

</th>

<th>Andy Montroll (<a href="Democratic_Party_(United_States)" title="Democratic Party (United States)">D</a>)

</th>

<td>6262 (Montroll) –

591 (Simpson)

</td>

<td>4570 (Montroll) –

2997 (Smith)

</td>

<td>4597 (Montroll) –

3664 (Wright)

</td>

<td>4064 (Montroll) –

3476 (Kiss)

</td>

</td></tr>

<tr>

<th>

</th>

<th>Bob Kiss (<a href="Vermont_Progressive_Party" title="Vermont Progressive Party">P</a>)

</th>

<td>5514 (Kiss) –

844 (Simpson)

</td>

<td>3944 (Kiss) –

3576 (Smith)

</td>

<td>4313 (Kiss) –

4061 (Wright)

</td>

</td>

<td>

</td></tr>

<tr>

<th>

</th>

<th>Kurt Wright (<a href="Republican_Party_(United_States)" title="Republican Party (United States)">R</a>)

</th>

<td>5270 (Wright) –

1310 (Simpson)

</td>

<td>3971 (Wright) –

3793 (Smith)

</td>

</td>

</td></tr>

<tr>

<th>

</th>

<th>Dan Smith (<a href="Independent_politician" title="Independent politician">I</a>)

</th>

<td>5570 (Smith) –

721 (Simpson)

</td>

</td>

</td></tr>

<tr>

<th>

</th>

<th>James Simpson (<a href="Green_Party_of_the_United_States" title="Green Party of the United States">G</a>)

</th>

</td>

</td></tr></tbody></table>

This leads to an overall preference ranking of:

<ol><li>Montroll – defeats all candidates below, including Kiss (4,064 to 3,476)</li>

<li>Kiss – defeats all candidates below, including Wright (4,313 to 4,061)</li>

<li>Wright – defeats all candidates below, including Smith (3,971 to 3,793)</li>

<li>Smith – defeats Simpson (5,570 to 721) and the write-in candidates</li></ol>

Montroll was therefore preferred over Kiss by 54% of voters, over Wright by 56% of voters, over Smith by 60%, and over Simpson by 91% of voters.<a href="#cite_note-Stensholt23-63">[63]</a><a href="#cite_note-:233-64">[64]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="2016_United_States_presidential_election">2016 United States presidential election</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="2016_United_States_presidential_election" title="2016 United States presidential election">2016 United States presidential election</a></div>

Another possible example is the <a href="2016_United_States_presidential_election" title="2016 United States presidential election">2016 United States presidential election</a>, where polls found several alternatives including <a href="Bernie_Sanders" title="Bernie Sanders">Bernie Sanders</a> and <a href="Gary_Johnson" title="Gary Johnson">Gary Johnson</a> defeating both <a href="Donald_Trump" title="Donald Trump">Donald Trump</a> and <a href="Hillary_Clinton" title="Hillary Clinton">Hillary Clinton</a> under a <a href="Condorcet_method" title="Condorcet method">majority-</a> or <a href="Rated_voting" title="Rated voting">rated-voting rules</a> but being squeezed out by both RCV and the <a href="Primary_election" title="Primary election">primary election</a> rules.<a href="#cite_note-:12-28">[28]</a><a href="#cite_note-65">[65]</a>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="2024_United_States_presidential_election">2024 United States presidential election</h3></div>

<div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="2024_United_States_presidential_election" title="2024 United States presidential election">2024 United States presidential election</a></div>

Election law scholar <a href="Ned_Foley" class="mw-redirect" title="Ned Foley">Ned Foley</a> criticized the <a href="Two-round_system" title="Two-round system">two-round system</a> variant used in the United States, which has been described as a first round of <a href="Primaries" class="mw-redirect" title="Primaries">primaries</a> before a de-facto runoff,<a href="#cite_note-66">[66]</a><a href="#cite_note-67">[67]</a> for creating a center squeeze in the 2024 presidential election and thus contributing to <a href="Political_polarization" title="Political polarization">political polarization</a>. Foley noted both the existing primary system and a hypothetical election instant-runoff system would lead to the election of <a href="Donald_Trump" title="Donald Trump">Donald Trump</a> by eliminating <a href="Nikki_Haley" title="Nikki Haley">Nikki Haley</a>, the majority-preferred (Condorcet) candidate according to polling.<a href="#cite_note-68">[68]</a><a href="#cite_note-69">[69]</a>

<ul><li><a href="Vote_splitting" class="mw-redirect" title="Vote splitting">Vote splitting</a></li>

<li><a href="Wasted_vote" title="Wasted vote">Wasted vote</a></li></ul>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="References">References</h2></div>

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</style><cite id="CITEREFMerrill1985" class="citation journal cs1">Merrill, Samuel (1985). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00127534">"A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions"</a>. Public Choice. 47 (2): 389–403. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fbf00127534">10.1007/bf00127534</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0048-5829">0048-5829</a>. <q>the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to winning</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Merrill_19842223-2"><a href="#cite_ref-Merrill_19842223_2-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFMerrill1984" class="citation journal cs1">Merrill, Samuel (1984). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2110786">"A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems"</a>. American Journal of Political Science. 28 (1): 23–48. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2110786">10.2307/2110786</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0092-5853">0092-5853</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2110786">2110786</a>. <q>However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-:0322232-3"><a href="#cite_ref-:0322232_3-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFAtkinsonGanz2022" class="citation web cs1">Atkinson, Nathan; Ganz, Scott C. (2022-10-30). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/3711206-the-flaw-in-ranked-choice-voting-rewarding-extremists/">"The flaw in ranked-choice voting: rewarding extremists"</a>. The Hill. Retrieved 2023-05-14. <q>However, ranked-choice voting makes it more difficult to elect moderate candidates when the electorate is polarized. For example, in a three-person race, the moderate candidate may be preferred by a majority of voters to each of the more extreme candidates. However, voters with far-left and far-right views will rank the candidate in second place rather than in first place. Since ranked-choice voting counts only the number of first-choice votes (among the remaining candidates), the moderate candidate would be eliminated in the first round, leaving one of the extreme candidates to be declared the winner.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-4"><a href="#cite_ref-4">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFFoley2024" class="citation web cs1">Foley, Edward B. (2024-08-17). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://edwardbfoley.substack.com/p/what-is-centripetalism-and-why-does">"What is "Centripetalism" and Why Does It Matter?"</a>. Common Ground Democracy. Retrieved 2025-01-30.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:8522222-5"><a href="#cite_ref-:8522222_5-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFMcGannKoetzleGrofman2002" class="citation journal cs1">McGann, Anthony J.; Koetzle, William; Grofman, Bernard (2002). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3088418">"How an Ideologically Concentrated Minority Can Trump a Dispersed Majority: Nonmedian Voter Results for Plurality, Run-off, and Sequential Elimination Elections"</a>. American Journal of Political Science. 46 (1): 134–147. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F3088418">10.2307/3088418</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0092-5853">0092-5853</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3088418">3088418</a>. <q>As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-:2322-6"><a href="#cite_ref-:2322_6-0">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.electionscience.org/library/irv-and-core-support/">"IRV and Core Support"</a>. The Center for Election Science. Retrieved December 4, 2019.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-Analysis_Alaska323-7">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-2">c</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-3">d</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-4">e</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-5">f</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-6">g</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-7">h</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-8">i</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Analysis_Alaska323_7-9">j</a> <cite id="CITEREFGraham-SquireMcCune2022" class="citation arxiv cs1">Graham-Squire, Adam; McCune, David (2022-09-11). "A Mathematical Analysis of the 2022 Alaska Special Election for US House". p. 2. <a href="ArXiv_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ArXiv (identifier)">arXiv</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.04764v3">2209.04764v3</a> [<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://arxiv.org/archive/econ.GN">econ.GN</a>]. <q>Since Begich wins both ... he is the Condorcet winner of the election ... AK election also contains a Condorcet loser: Sarah Palin. ... she is also a spoiler candidate</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-8"><a href="#cite_ref-8">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFBalinskiLaraki2011" class="citation cs2">Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida (2011), Dolez, Bernard; Grofman, Bernard; Laurent, Annie (eds.), <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7539-3_2">"Election by Majority Judgment: Experimental Evidence"</a>, In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform: French Presidential Elections, New York, NY: Springer, pp. 13–54, <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-7539-3_2">10.1007/978-1-4419-7539-3_2</a>, <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-1-4419-7539-3</bdi>, retrieved 2024-10-31</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-9"><a href="#cite_ref-9">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFBalinskiLaraki2020" class="citation journal cs1">Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida (2020-03-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs00355-019-01200-x">"Majority judgment vs. majority rule"</a>. Social Choice and Welfare. 54 (2): 429–461. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs00355-019-01200-x">10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1432-217X">1432-217X</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:152223-10">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:152223_10-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:152223_10-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:152223_10-2">c</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:152223_10-3">d</a> <cite id="CITEREFMerrill1984" class="citation journal cs1">Merrill, Samuel (1984). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2110786">"A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems"</a>. American Journal of Political Science. 28 (1): 23–48. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2110786">10.2307/2110786</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0092-5853">0092-5853</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2110786">2110786</a>. <q>However, squeezed by surrounding opponents, a centrist candidate may receive few first-place votes and be eliminated under Hare.</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:032223-11"><a href="#cite_ref-:032223_11-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFAtkinsonGanz2022" class="citation web cs1">Atkinson, Nathan; Ganz, Scott C. (2022-10-30). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/3711206-the-flaw-in-ranked-choice-voting-rewarding-extremists/">"The flaw in ranked-choice voting: rewarding extremists"</a>. The Hill. Retrieved 2023-05-14. <q>However, ranked-choice voting makes it more difficult to elect moderate candidates when the electorate is polarized. For example, in a three-person race, the moderate candidate may be preferred by a majority of voters to each of the more extreme candidates. However, voters with far-left and far-right views will rank the candidate in second place rather than in first place. Since ranked-choice voting counts only the number of first-choice votes (among the remaining candidates), the moderate candidate would be eliminated in the first round, leaving one of the extreme candidates to be declared the winner.</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-Merril_19852242223-12">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Merril_19852242223_12-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Merril_19852242223_12-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Merril_19852242223_12-2">c</a> <cite id="CITEREFMerrill1985" class="citation journal cs1">Merrill, Samuel (1985). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00127534">"A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions"</a>. Public Choice. 47 (2): 389–403. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fbf00127534">10.1007/bf00127534</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0048-5829">0048-5829</a>. <q>the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to winning</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:852223-13">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:852223_13-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:852223_13-1">b</a> <cite id="CITEREFMcGannKoetzleGrofman2002" class="citation journal cs1">McGann, Anthony J.; Koetzle, William; Grofman, Bernard (2002). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3088418">"How an Ideologically Concentrated Minority Can Trump a Dispersed Majority: Nonmedian Voter Results for Plurality, Run-off, and Sequential Elimination Elections"</a>. American Journal of Political Science. 46 (1): 134–147. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F3088418">10.2307/3088418</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0092-5853">0092-5853</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3088418">3088418</a>. <q>As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-Ogren_102799223-14">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Ogren_102799223_14-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Ogren_102799223_14-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Ogren_102799223_14-2">c</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Ogren_102799223_14-3">d</a> <cite id="CITEREFOgren2024" class="citation journal cs1">Ogren, Marcus (2024-08-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026137942400057X">"Candidate incentive distributions: How voting methods shape electoral incentives"</a>. Electoral Studies. 90: 102799. <a href="ArXiv_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ArXiv (identifier)">arXiv</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.07147">2306.07147</a>. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.electstud.2024.102799">10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102799</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0261-3794">0261-3794</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-Lewyn_20122232223-15">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Lewyn_20122232223_15-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Lewyn_20122232223_15-1">b</a> <a href="#CITEREFLewyn2012">Lewyn 2012</a>: "third place Candidate C is a centrist who is the second choice of Candidate A's left-wing supporters and Candidate B's right-wing supporters. ... In such a situation, Candidate C would prevail over both Candidates A ... and B ... in a one-on-one runoff election. Yet, Candidate C would not prevail under IRV because he or she finished third and thus would be the first candidate eliminated"

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<li id="cite_note-Davis_197022232-16"><a href="#cite_ref-Davis_197022232_16-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFDavisHinichOrdeshook1970" class="citation journal cs1">Davis, Otto A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; Ordeshook, Peter C. (1970-01-01). "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process". The American Political Science Review. 64 (2): 426–448. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F1953842">10.2307/1953842</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1953842">1953842</a>. <a href="S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:1161006">1161006</a>. <q>Since our model is multi-dimensional, we can incorporate all criteria which we normally associate with a citizen's voting decision process — issues, style, partisan identification, and the like.</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:242223-17">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:242223_17-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:242223_17-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:242223_17-2">c</a> <cite id="CITEREFRobinette2023" class="citation journal cs1">Robinette, Robbie (2023-09-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09378-6">"Implications of strategic position choices by candidates"</a>. Constitutional Political Economy. 34 (3): 445–457. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10602-022-09378-6">10.1007/s10602-022-09378-6</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1572-9966">1572-9966</a>.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-18"><a href="#cite_ref-18">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFOgren2024" class="citation web cs1">Ogren, Marcus (2024-05-08). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://voting-in-the-abstract.medium.com/the-primordial-election-that-is-never-held-e019356faf90">"The primordial election that is never held"</a>. Medium. Retrieved 2024-09-05.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-:2223222-19"><a href="#cite_ref-:2223222_19-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFMusselSchlechta2023" class="citation journal cs1">Mussel, Johanan D.; Schlechta, Henry (2023-07-21). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688231189363">"Australia: No party convergence where we would most expect it"</a>. Party Politics. 30 (6): 1040–1050. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F13540688231189363">10.1177/13540688231189363</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1354-0688">1354-0688</a>.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-20"><a href="#cite_ref-20">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFLewyn2012" class="citation journal cs1">Lewyn, Michael (2012). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2276015">"Two Cheers for Instant Runoff Voting"</a>. 6 Phoenix L. Rev. 117. Rochester, NY. <a href="SSRN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="SSRN (identifier)">SSRN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2276015">2276015</a>.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-21"><a href="#cite_ref-21">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFOgren2022" class="citation web cs1">Ogren, Marcus (2022-11-16). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://voting-in-the-abstract.medium.com/rcv-in-the-2022-australian-election-cdc9a8b77d84">"RCV in the 2022 Australian Election"</a>. Medium. Retrieved 2024-09-05.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-22"><a href="#cite_ref-22">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://electionlab.mit.edu/articles/effect-ranked-choice-voting-maine">"The Effect of Ranked-Choice Voting in Maine | MIT Election Lab"</a>. electionlab.mit.edu. Retrieved 2024-07-25. <q>One of the main claims made by reformers about RCV is that it will make campaigns more civil, as campaigns will have the incentive to seek the second-place vote of supporters of different candidates. To study this claim, I first conducted a difference-in-differences analysis on independent expenditures for and against candidates. In this analysis, I found that negative spending increased significantly in Maine following the implementation of ranked-choice voting, casting doubt on the claim that RCV makes campaigns more civil. To provide more evidence, I also created a dataset of all Facebook advertisements that mentioned any congressional candidates for 2018, the first year that RCV was used in Maine. I then conducted a sentiment analysis to find each advertisement's sentiment (whether it was negative or not). I then used genetic matching to approximate an experiment to find the impact of RCV on civility. In doing so, I found that the 2018 campaign was even more negative than in paired districts around the country.</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-23"><a href="#cite_ref-23">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFFraenkelGrofman2006" class="citation journal cs1">Fraenkel, Jon; Grofman, Bernard (2006-06-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414005285032">"Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies?: The Case of Fiji"</a>. Comparative Political Studies. 39 (5): 623–651. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010414005285032">10.1177/0010414005285032</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0010-4140">0010-4140</a>. <q>Fiji's objective of ameliorating ethnic divisions by the adoption of AV was not successful. In elections in 1999 and 2001, moderate parties would have fared better under a proportional representation system</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:33222-24"><a href="#cite_ref-:33222_24-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFFraenkelGrofman2006" class="citation journal cs1">Fraenkel, Jon; Grofman, Bernard (2006-06-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414005285035">"The Failure of the Alternative Vote as a Tool for Ethnic Moderation in Fiji: A Rejoinder to Horowitz"</a>. Comparative Political Studies. 39 (5): 663–666. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010414005285035">10.1177/0010414005285035</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0010-4140">0010-4140</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-25"><a href="#cite_ref-25">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFVishwanath2021" class="citation journal cs1">Vishwanath, Arjun (2021). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3802566">"Electoral Institutions and Substantive Representation in Local Politics: The Effects of Ranked Choice Voting"</a>. SSRN Electronic Journal. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2139%2Fssrn.3802566">10.2139/ssrn.3802566</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1556-5068">1556-5068</a>.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-26"><a href="#cite_ref-26">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFKousserPhillipsShor2016" class="citation journal cs1">Kousser, Thad; Phillips, Justin; Shor, Boris (2016). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fpsrm.2016.43">"Reform and Representation: A New Method Applied to Recent Electoral Changes*"</a>. Political Science Research and Methods. 6 (4): 809–827. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fpsrm.2016.43">10.1017/psrm.2016.43</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/2049-8470">2049-8470</a>. <a href="SSRN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="SSRN (identifier)">SSRN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2260083">2260083</a>. <q>neither the Citizens Redistricting Commission nor the top-two primary immediately halted the continuing partisan polarization of California's elected lawmakers or their drift away from the average voter</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:2322232222-27"><a href="#cite_ref-:2322232222_27-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFKousser" class="citation news cs1">Kousser, Thad. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://theconversation.com/californias-jungle-primary-sets-up-polarized-governors-race-for-november-97772">"California's jungle primary sets up polarized governor's race for November"</a>. The Conversation. Retrieved 2018-06-23. <q>The idea was that by opening up primaries to all voters, regardless of party, a flood of new centrist voters would arrive. That would give moderate candidates a route to victory[...] Candidates did not represent voters any better after the reforms, taking positions just as polarized as they did before the top two. We detected no shift toward the ideological middle.</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:12-28">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:12_28-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:12_28-1">b</a> <cite id="CITEREFPotthoffMunger2021" class="citation journal cs1">Potthoff, Richard F.; Munger, Michael C. (November 2021). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1532673X211009499">"Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner: Not Clinton?"</a>. American Politics Research. 49 (6): 618–636. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1532673X211009499">10.1177/1532673X211009499</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1532-673X">1532-673X</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:0-29">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:0_29-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:0_29-1">b</a> <cite id="CITEREFDeGroot1970" class="citation book cs1">DeGroot, Morris H. (1970). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=7rDY2_r4bmEC&pg=PA232">Optimal Statistical Decisions</a>. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York-London-Sydney. p. 232. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780471680291</bdi>. <a href="MR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="MR (identifier)">MR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=0356303">0356303</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:0223-30"><a href="#cite_ref-:0223_30-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFLaslier2009" class="citation journal cs1">Laslier, Jean-François (January 2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629808097286">"The Leader Rule: A Model of Strategic Approval Voting in a Large Electorate"</a>. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 21 (1): 113–136. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0951629808097286">10.1177/0951629808097286</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0951-6298">0951-6298</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-Handbook_on_Approval_Voting23-31"><a href="#cite_ref-Handbook_on_Approval_Voting23_31-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFLaslierSanver2010" class="citation book cs1">Laslier, Jean-François; Sanver, M. Remzi, eds. (2010). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7">Handbook on Approval Voting</a>. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. p. 2. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-642-02839-7">10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-3-642-02838-0</bdi>. <q>By eliminating the squeezing effect, Approval Voting would encourage the election of consensual candidates. The squeezing effect is typically observed in multiparty elections with a runoff. The runoff tends to prevent extremist candidates from winning, but a centrist candidate who would win any pairwise runoff (the "Condorcet winner") is also often "squeezed" between the left-wing and the right-wing candidates and so eliminated in the first round.</q></cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:1223-32"><a href="#cite_ref-:1223_32-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFCox1985" class="citation journal cs1">Cox, Gary W. (1985). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111214">"Electoral Equilibrium under Approval Voting"</a>. American Journal of Political Science. 29 (1): 112–118. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2111214">10.2307/2111214</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0092-5853">0092-5853</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111214">2111214</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-35"><a href="#cite_ref-35">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://fairvote.org/our-reforms/ranked-choice-voting/">"Ranked Choice Voting"</a>. FairVote. Retrieved 2024-07-22.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-36"><a href="#cite_ref-36">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.rcvresources.org/blog-post/avoid-vote-splitting-and-weak-plurality-results">"Avoid Vote-Splitting and Weak Plurality Results"</a>. RCV Resources. Ranked Choice Voting Resource Center. 2020-11-09. Retrieved 2024-07-22.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-37"><a href="#cite_ref-37">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFAtkinsonFoleyGanz2023" class="citation journal cs1">Atkinson, Nathan; Foley, Edward B.; Ganz, Scott (2023). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=4411173">"Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?"</a>. SSRN Electronic Journal. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2139%2Fssrn.4411173">10.2139/ssrn.4411173</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1556-5068">1556-5068</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:4-38"><a href="#cite_ref-:4_38-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFKeskinSanverTosunlu2022" class="citation journal cs1">Keskin, Umut; Sanver, M. Remzi; Tosunlu, H. Berkay (August 2022). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://hal.science/hal-03413280/document">"Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections"</a>. Social Choice and Welfare. 59 (2): 305–333. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs00355-022-01397-4">10.1007/s00355-022-01397-4</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-40"><a href="#cite_ref-40">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFBalinskiLaraki2020" class="citation journal cs1">Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida (2020-03-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs00355-019-01200-x">"Majority judgment vs. majority rule"</a>. Social Choice and Welfare. 54 (2): 429–461. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs00355-019-01200-x">10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1432-217X">1432-217X</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-akdoe1-41"><a href="#cite_ref-akdoe1_41-0">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/22SSPG/ElectionSummaryReportRPTS.pdf">"State of Alaska | 2022 Special General Election | Election Summary Report | August 16, 2022"</a> (PDF). Alaska Division of Elections. September 2, 2022. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220817053708/https://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/22SSPG/ElectionSummaryReportRPTS.pdf">Archived</a> (PDF) from the original on August 17, 2022. Retrieved September 2, 2022.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:0222223-42">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:0222223_42-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:0222223_42-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:0222223_42-2">c</a> <cite id="CITEREFAtkinsonGanz2022" class="citation web cs1">Atkinson, Nathan; Ganz, Scott C. (2022-10-30). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/3711206-the-flaw-in-ranked-choice-voting-rewarding-extremists/">"The flaw in ranked-choice voting: rewarding extremists"</a>. The Hill. Retrieved 2023-05-14. <q>However, ranked-choice voting makes it more difficult to elect moderate candidates when the electorate is polarized. For example, in a three-person race, the moderate candidate may be preferred to each of the more extreme candidates by a majority of voters. However, voters with far-left and far-right views will rank the candidate in second place rather than in first place. Since ranked-choice voting counts only the number of first-choice votes (among the remaining candidates), the moderate candidate would be eliminated in the first round, leaving one of the extreme candidates to be declared the winner.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-easy_fix2223-43">^ <a href="#cite_ref-easy_fix2223_43-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-easy_fix2223_43-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-easy_fix2223_43-2">c</a> <cite id="CITEREFMaskinFoley2022" class="citation news cs1"><a href="Eric_Maskin" title="Eric Maskin">Maskin, Eric</a>; Foley, Edward B. (2022-11-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/11/01/alaska-final-four-primary-begich-palin-peltola/">"Alaska's ranked-choice voting is flawed. But there's an easy fix"</a>. Washington Post. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0190-8286">0190-8286</a>. Retrieved 2024-02-09.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:133-44">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:133_44-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:133_44-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:133_44-2">c</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:133_44-3">d</a> <cite id="CITEREFClelland2023" class="citation arxiv cs1">Clelland, Jeanne N. (2023-02-28). "Ranked Choice Voting And the Center Squeeze in the Alaska 2022 Special Election: How Might Other Voting Methods Compare?". p. 6. <a href="ArXiv_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ArXiv (identifier)">arXiv</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.00108v1">2303.00108v1</a> [<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://arxiv.org/archive/cs.CY">cs.CY</a>].</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:3223-45">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:3223_45-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:3223_45-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:3223_45-2">c</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:3223_45-3">d</a> <cite id="CITEREFGraham-SquireMcCune2024" class="citation journal cs1">Graham-Squire, Adam; McCune, David (2024-01-02). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10724117.2023.2224675">"Ranked Choice Wackiness in Alaska"</a>. Math Horizons. 31 (1): 24–27. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1080%2F10724117.2023.2224675">10.1080/10724117.2023.2224675</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1072-4117">1072-4117</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-easy_fix222223-46"><a href="#cite_ref-easy_fix222223_46-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFMaskinFoley2022" class="citation news cs1"><a href="Eric_Maskin" title="Eric Maskin">Maskin, Eric</a>; Foley, Edward B. (2022-11-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/11/01/alaska-final-four-primary-begich-palin-peltola/">"Opinion: Alaska's ranked-choice voting is flawed. But there's an easy fix"</a>. Washington Post. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0190-8286">0190-8286</a>. Retrieved 2024-02-09.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-47"><a href="#cite_ref-47">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFDoronKronick1977" class="citation journal cs1">Doron, Gideon; Kronick, Richard (1977). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2110496">"Single Transferrable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function"</a>. American Journal of Political Science. 21 (2): 303–311. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2110496">10.2307/2110496</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0092-5853">0092-5853</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2110496">2110496</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-48"><a href="#cite_ref-48">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFHamlin2022" class="citation web cs1">Hamlin, Aaron (2022-09-16). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://electionscience.org/archive/rcv-fools-palin-voters-into-electing-a-progressive-democrat/">"RCV Fools Palin Voters into Electing a Progressive Democrat"</a>. The Center for Election Science. Retrieved 2024-07-11. <q>It's a good thing for Peltola that she didn't attract more Palin voters—she'd have lost [...] The strangeness continues. Peltola could have actually gotten more 1st choice votes in this election and caused herself to lose. How's that? Let's look. [...] Imagine if Peltola reached across the aisle and spoke directly to Palin voters. Imagine that she empathized with their position and identified issues they cared about that Palin and even Begich ignored. And let's say that as a consequence, Peltola got the first-choice votes of between 5,200 and 8,500 voters who would have otherwise ranked only Palin. What happens as a result? Palin would have gotten eliminated in the first round and Peltola would still not be able to beat Begich.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-burlington_votes23-49">^ <a href="#cite_ref-burlington_votes23_49-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-burlington_votes23_49-1">b</a> <cite class="citation web cs1 cs1-prop-unfit"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080130053047/http://www.burlingtonvotes.org/faq/">"Frequently Asked Questions about Burlington's use of Instant Runoff Voting"</a>. Archived from the original on January 30, 2008. Retrieved July 21, 2024. <q>4. How did this change to IRV come about? Over 64% of Burlington voters voted in favor of the IRV Charter amendment in March 2005, and it went into effect on May 12, 2005, when the governor signed the ratification bill, H.505, which had been passed by both the House and Senate.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-50"><a href="#cite_ref-50">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071129081028/http://www.ci.burlington.vt.us/mayor/">"Mayor Bob Kiss"</a>. City of Burlington. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.ci.burlington.vt.us/mayor/">the original</a> on November 29, 2007. Retrieved November 16, 2007.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-51"><a href="#cite_ref-51">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1 cs1-prop-unfit"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110725111725/http://www.burlingtonvotes.org/20090303/2009%20Burlington%20Mayor%20Round.htm">"ChoicePlus Pro 2009 Burlington Mayor Round Detail Report"</a>. July 25, 2011. Archived from the original on July 25, 2011. Retrieved January 3, 2018.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-52"><a href="#cite_ref-52">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFFelsenthalTideman2014" class="citation journal cs1">Felsenthal, Dan S.; Tideman, Nicolaus (2014). "Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods". Mathematical Social Sciences. 67: 57–66. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.mathsocsci.2013.08.001">10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.08.001</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0165-4896">0165-4896</a>. <q>A display of non-monotonicity under the Alternative Vote method was reported recently, for the March 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, Vermont.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-:823-53"><a href="#cite_ref-:823_53-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFOrnsteinNorman2014" class="citation journal cs1">Ornstein, Joseph T.; Norman, Robert Z. (October 1, 2014). "Frequency of monotonicity failure under Instant Runoff Voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections". Public Choice. 161 (1–2): 1–9. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11127-013-0118-2">10.1007/s11127-013-0118-2</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0048-5829">0048-5829</a>. <a href="S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:30833409">30833409</a>. <q>Although the Democrat was the Condorcet winner (a majority of voters preferred him in all two way contests), he received the fewest first-place votes and so was eliminated ... 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, VT, which illustrates the key features of an upward monotonicity failure</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Voting_Paradoxes23-54"><a href="#cite_ref-Voting_Paradoxes23_54-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFBaruth2009" class="citation web cs1">Baruth, Philip (March 12, 2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110726125814/http://vermontdailybriefing.com/?p=1213">"Voting Paradoxes and Perverse Outcomes: Political Scientist Tony Gierzynski Lays Out A Case Against Instant Runoff Voting"</a>. Vermont Daily Briefing. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://vermontdailybriefing.com/?p=1213">the original</a> on July 26, 2011.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-ScoreVotingNet23-55"><a href="#cite_ref-ScoreVotingNet23_55-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFGierzynskiHamiltonSmith2009" class="citation web cs1">Gierzynski, Anthony; Hamilton, Wes; Smith, Warren D. (March 2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://scorevoting.net/Burlington.html">"Burlington Vermont 2009 IRV mayoral election"</a>. RangeVoting.org. Retrieved October 1, 2017. <q>Montroll was favored over Republican Kurt Wright 56% to 44% ... and over Progressive Bob Kiss 54% to 46% ... In other words, in voting terminology, Montroll was a 'beats-all winner,' also called a 'Condorcet winner' ... However, in the IRV election, Montroll came in third! ... voters preferred Montroll over every other candidate ... Montroll is the most-approved</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-:033-56"><a href="#cite_ref-:033_56-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFBristow-Johnson2023" class="citation journal cs1">Bristow-Johnson, Robert (2023). "The failure of Instant Runoff to accomplish the purpose for which it was adopted: a case study from Burlington Vermont". Constitutional Political Economy. 34 (3): 378–389. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10602-023-09393-1">10.1007/s10602-023-09393-1</a>.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-57"><a href="#cite_ref-57">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFEllenberg2014" class="citation book cs1">Ellenberg, Jordan (May 29, 2014). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/hownottobewrongp0000elle">How Not to Be Wrong: The Power of Mathematical Thinking</a>. Penguin. p. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/hownottobewrongp0000elle/page/385">385</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780698163843</bdi>. <q>a majority of voters liked the centrist candidate Montroll better than Kiss, and a majority of voters liked Montroll better than Wright ... yet Montroll was tossed in the first round.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Lewyn_p._122_note_19-58">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Lewyn_p._122_note_19_58-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Lewyn_p._122_note_19_58-1">b</a> <a href="#CITEREFLewyn2012">Lewyn 2012</a>, p. 122, note 19: "election where Democratic candidate for mayor was Condorcet winner but finished third behind Republican and 'Progressive,'"

</li>

<li id="cite_note-59"><a href="#cite_ref-59">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFStensholt2015" class="citation journal cs1 cs1-prop-long-vol">Stensholt, Eivind (October 7, 2015). "What Happened in Burlington?". NHH Dept. Of Business and Management Science. Discussion Paper No. 2015/26. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2139%2Fssrn.2670462">10.2139/ssrn.2670462</a>. <a href="Hdl_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Hdl (identifier)">hdl</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://hdl.handle.net/11250%2F2356264">11250/2356264</a>. <a href="SSRN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="SSRN (identifier)">SSRN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670462">2670462</a>. <q>K was elected even though M was a clear Condorcet winner and W was a clear Plurality winner.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-Laatu_200923-60"><a href="#cite_ref-Laatu_200923_60-0">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFLaatuSmith2009" class="citation web cs1">Laatu, Juho; Smith, Warren D. (March 2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://rangevoting.org/JLburl09.txt">"The Rank-Order Votes in the 2009 Burlington Mayoral Election"</a>.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-rutland_herald23-61"><a href="#cite_ref-rutland_herald23_61-0">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160304055602/http://www.rutlandherald.com/article/20100427/NEWS03/4270339/1004/NEWS03">"Instant run-off voting experiment ends in Burlington : Rutland Herald Online"</a>. Rutlandherald.com. April 27, 2010. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.rutlandherald.com/article/20100427/NEWS03/4270339/1004/NEWS03">the original</a> on March 4, 2016. Retrieved April 1, 2016.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-BVT2010030223-62"><a href="#cite_ref-BVT2010030223_62-0">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/sites/default/files/CT/ElectionResults/20100302/election_summary_report_20100302.pdf">"Official Results Of 2010 Annual City Election"</a> (PDF). City of Burlington. March 2, 2010.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-:233-64"><a href="#cite_ref-:233_64-0">^</a> <cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.electionscience.org/library/irv-and-core-support/">"IRV and Core Support"</a>. The Center for Election Science. Retrieved December 4, 2019.</cite>

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<li id="cite_note-65"><a href="#cite_ref-65">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFIgersheimDurandHamlinLaslier2022" class="citation journal cs1">Igersheim, Herrade; Durand, François; Hamlin, Aaron; Laslier, Jean-François (2022). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://hal.science/halshs-01972097/">"Comparing Voting Methods : 2016 US Presidential Election"</a>. European Journal of Political Economy. 71. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.ejpoleco.2021.102057">10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102057</a>.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-66"><a href="#cite_ref-66">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFSantucciShugartLatner2023" class="citation web cs1">Santucci, Jack; Shugart, Matthew; Latner, Michael S. (October 16, 2023). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://protectdemocracy.org/work/toward-a-different-kind-of-party-government/">"Toward a Different Kind of Party Government"</a>. Protect Democracy. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20240716205506/https://protectdemocracy.org/work/toward-a-different-kind-of-party-government/">Archived</a> from the original on July 16, 2024. Retrieved November 15, 2024. <q>Finally, we should not discount the role of primaries. When we look at the range of countries with first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections (given no primaries), none with an assembly larger than Jamaica's (63) has a strict two-party system. These countries include the United Kingdom and Canada (where multiparty competition is in fact nationwide). Whether the U.S. should be called 'FPTP' itself is dubious, and not only because some states (e.g. Georgia) hold runoffs or use the alternative vote (e.g. Maine). Rather, the U.S. has an unusual two-round system in which the first round winnows the field. This usually is at the intraparty level, although sometimes it is without regard to party (e.g. in Alaska and California).</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-67"><a href="#cite_ref-67">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFBowlerGrofmanBlais2009" class="citation book cs1">Bowler, Shaun; Grofman, Bernard; Blais, André (2009). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-387-09720-6_9">"The United States: A Case of Duvergerian Equilibrium"</a>. Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting: The Logic of Party Competition in Canada, India, the United Kingdom and the United States. New York, New York: Springer. pp. 135–146. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-0-387-09720-6_9">10.1007/978-0-387-09720-6_9</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-387-09720-6</bdi>. Retrieved November 15, 2024. <q>In effect, the primary system means that the USA has a two-round runoff system of elections.</q></cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-68"><a href="#cite_ref-68">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFFoley2024" class="citation web cs1">Foley, Edward B. (January 20, 2024). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://edwardbfoley.substack.com/p/haleys-campaign-demonstrates-the">"Haley's Campaign Demonstrates the Need for Electoral Reform"</a>. Common Ground Democracy. Retrieved November 11, 2024.</cite>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-69"><a href="#cite_ref-69">^</a> <cite id="CITEREFFoley2024" class="citation web cs1">Foley, Edward B. (November 6, 2024). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://edwardbfoley.substack.com/p/the-case-for-condorcet-voting-is">"The Case for Condorcet Voting Is Clear"</a>. Common Ground Democracy. Retrieved November 15, 2024.</cite>

</li>

</ol></div></div>

<ul><li>As of <a class="external text external" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Center_squeeze&oldid=1222986402">this edit</a>, this article is derived in whole or in part from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Center_squeeze">"Center squeeze"</a>, authored by <a rel="nofollow" class="external free" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Center_squeeze?action=history">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Center_squeeze?action=history</a>. The copyright holder has licensed the content in a manner that permits reuse under the CC-BY-SA 4.0 and GFDL. All relevant terms must be followed.</li></ul>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="External_links">External links</h2></div>

<ul><li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://electionscience.org/learn/library/education/vote-splitting">Center for Election Science: Vote Splitting</a></li>

<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://rangevoting.org/IrvCenterSqueeze.html">The Center for Range Voting: IRV "center squeeze" pathology</a></li></ul>

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</style></div><div role="navigation" class="navbox" aria-labelledby="Electoral_systems390" style="padding:3px"><table class="nowraplinks mw-collapsible mw-collapsed navbox-inner" style="border-spacing:0;background:transparent;color:inherit"><tbody><tr><th scope="col" class="navbox-title" colspan="2"><div id="Electoral_systems390" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="Electoral_system" title="Electoral system">Electoral systems</a></div></th></tr><tr><td class="navbox-abovebelow" colspan="2"><div>Part of the <a href="Portal%3APolitics" title="Portal:Politics">politics</a> and <a href="Portal%3AEconomics" title="Portal:Economics">Economics</a> series</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="Single-winner_voting_system" class="mw-redirect" title="Single-winner voting system">Single-winner</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Approval_voting" title="Approval voting">Approval voting</a>

<ul><li><a href="Combined_approval_voting" title="Combined approval voting">Combined approval voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Unified_primary" title="Unified primary">Unified primary</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Borda_count" title="Borda count">Borda count</a></li>

<li><a href="Bucklin_voting" title="Bucklin voting">Bucklin voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Condorcet_methods" class="mw-redirect" title="Condorcet methods">Condorcet methods</a>

<ul><li><a href="Copeland's_method" title="Copeland's method">Copeland's method</a></li>

<li><a href="Dodgson's_method" title="Dodgson's method">Dodgson's method</a></li>

<li><a href="Kemeny_method" title="Kemeny method">Kemeny method</a></li>

<li><a href="Minimax_Condorcet_method" title="Minimax Condorcet method">Minimax Condorcet method</a></li>

<li><a href="Nanson's_method" title="Nanson's method">Nanson's method</a></li>

<li><a href="Ranked_pairs" title="Ranked pairs">Ranked pairs</a></li>

<li><a href="Schulze_method" title="Schulze method">Schulze method</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Exhaustive_ballot" title="Exhaustive ballot">Exhaustive ballot</a></li>

<li><a href="First-past-the-post_voting" title="First-past-the-post voting">First-past-the-post voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Instant-runoff_voting" title="Instant-runoff voting">Instant-runoff voting</a>

<ul><li><a href="Coombs'_method" title="Coombs' method">Coombs' method</a></li>

<li><a href="Contingent_vote" title="Contingent vote">Contingent vote</a></li>

<li><a href="Supplementary_vote" class="mw-redirect" title="Supplementary vote">Supplementary vote</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Majority_rule" title="Majority rule">Simple majoritarianism</a></li>

<li><a href="Plurality_voting_system" class="mw-redirect" title="Plurality voting system">Plurality</a></li>

<li><a href="Positional_voting_system" class="mw-redirect" title="Positional voting system">Positional voting system</a></li>

<li><a href="Score_voting" title="Score voting">Score voting</a></li>

<li><a href="STAR_voting" title="STAR voting">STAR voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Two-round_system" title="Two-round system">Two-round system</a></li>

<li><a href="Graduated_majority_judgment" title="Graduated majority judgment">Graduated majority judgment</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="Proportional_representation" title="Proportional representation">Proportional</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"></div><table class="nowraplinks navbox-subgroup" style="border-spacing:0"><tbody><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Systems</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Mixed-member_proportional_representation" title="Mixed-member proportional representation">Mixed-member</a></li>

<li><a href="Mixed_single_vote#Proportional_systems" title="Mixed single vote">Mixed single vote</a></li>

<li><a href="Party-list_proportional_representation" title="Party-list proportional representation">Party-list</a></li>

<li><a href="Proportional_approval_voting" title="Proportional approval voting">Proportional approval voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Rural%E2%80%93urban_proportional_representation" title="Rural–urban proportional representation">Rural–urban</a></li>

<li><a href="Sequential_proportional_approval_voting" title="Sequential proportional approval voting">Sequential proportional approval voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Single_transferable_vote" title="Single transferable vote">Single transferable vote</a>

<li><a href="Hare%E2%80%93Clark_electoral_system" title="Hare–Clark electoral system">Hare–Clark</a></li>

<li><a href="Schulze_STV" title="Schulze STV">Schulze STV</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Spare_vote" title="Spare vote">Spare vote</a></li>

<li><a href="Indirect_single_transferable_voting" title="Indirect single transferable voting">Indirect single transferable voting</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Allocation</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Highest_averages_method" title="Highest averages method">Highest averages method</a>

<ul><li><a href="Sainte-Lagu%C3%AB_method" title="Sainte-Laguë method">Webster/Sainte-Laguë</a></li>

<li><a href="D'Hondt_method" title="D'Hondt method">D'Hondt</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Largest_remainders_method" class="mw-redirect" title="Largest remainders method">Largest remainders method</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Quotas</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Droop_quota" title="Droop quota">Droop quota</a></li>

<li><a href="Hagenbach-Bischoff_quota" class="mw-redirect" title="Hagenbach-Bischoff quota">Hagenbach-Bischoff quota</a></li>

<li><a href="Hare_quota" title="Hare quota">Hare quota</a></li>

<li><a href="Imperiali_quota" title="Imperiali quota">Imperiali quota</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr></tbody></table><div></div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="Mixed_electoral_system" title="Mixed electoral system">Mixed</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Parallel_voting" title="Parallel voting">Parallel voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Additional_member_system" class="mw-redirect" title="Additional member system">Additional member system</a></li>

<li><a href="Alternative_vote_plus" title="Alternative vote plus">Alternative vote plus</a></li>

<li><a href="Mixed_single_vote" title="Mixed single vote">Mixed single vote</a></li>

<li><a href="Mixed_ballot_transferable_vote" title="Mixed ballot transferable vote">Mixed ballot transferable vote</a></li>

<li><a href="Scorporo" title="Scorporo">Scorporo</a></li>

<li><a href="Vote_linkage_mixed_system" class="mw-redirect" title="Vote linkage mixed system">Vote linkage mixed system</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="Semi-proportional_representation" title="Semi-proportional representation">Semi-proportional</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Single_non-transferable_vote" title="Single non-transferable vote">Single non-transferable vote</a></li>

<li><a href="Limited_voting" title="Limited voting">Limited voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Cumulative_voting" title="Cumulative voting">Cumulative voting</a></li>

<li><a href="Satisfaction_approval_voting" title="Satisfaction approval voting">Satisfaction approval voting</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Criteria</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Condorcet_winner_criterion" title="Condorcet winner criterion">Condorcet winner criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Condorcet_loser_criterion" title="Condorcet loser criterion">Condorcet loser criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Consistency_criterion" title="Consistency criterion">Consistency criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Independence_of_clones_criterion" title="Independence of clones criterion">Independence of clones</a></li>

<li><a href="Independence_of_irrelevant_alternatives" title="Independence of irrelevant alternatives">Independence of irrelevant alternatives</a></li>

<li><a href="Independence_of_Smith-dominated_alternatives" title="Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives">Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives</a></li>

<li><a href="Later-no-harm_criterion" title="Later-no-harm criterion">Later-no-harm criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Majority_favorite_criterion" class="mw-redirect" title="Majority favorite criterion">Majority criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Majority_loser_criterion" title="Majority loser criterion">Majority loser criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Monotonicity_criterion" class="mw-redirect" title="Monotonicity criterion">Monotonicity criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Mutual_majority_criterion" title="Mutual majority criterion">Mutual majority criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Participation_criterion" title="Participation criterion">Participation criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Plurality_criterion" class="mw-redirect" title="Plurality criterion">Plurality criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Resolvability_criterion" class="mw-redirect" title="Resolvability criterion">Resolvability criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Reversal_symmetry" title="Reversal symmetry">Reversal symmetry</a></li>

<li><a href="Smith_criterion" class="mw-redirect" title="Smith criterion">Smith criterion</a></li>

<li><a href="Seats-to-votes_ratio" title="Seats-to-votes ratio">Seats-to-votes ratio</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Other</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Ballot" title="Ballot">Ballot</a></li>

<li><a href="Election_threshold" class="mw-redirect" title="Election threshold">Election threshold</a></li>

<li><a href="First-preference_votes" class="mw-redirect" title="First-preference votes">First-preference votes</a></li>

<li><a href="Liquid_democracy" title="Liquid democracy">Liquid democracy</a></li>

<li><a href="Spoilt_vote" title="Spoilt vote">Spoilt vote</a></li>

<li><a href="Sortition" title="Sortition">Sortition</a></li>

<li><a href="Unseating" title="Unseating">Unseating</a></li>

<li><a href="Wasted_vote" title="Wasted vote">Wasted vote</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Comparison</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Comparison_of_voting_rules" title="Comparison of voting rules">Comparison of voting systems</a></li>

<li><a href="List_of_electoral_systems_by_country" title="List of electoral systems by country">Voting systems by country</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><td class="navbox-abovebelow" colspan="2"><div><a href="Portal%3APolitics" title="Portal:Politics">Portal</a> — Project</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><div><div class="zim-footer">

This article is issued from <a class="external text" title="Last edited on 2025-07-01" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/?title=Center_squeeze&oldid=1298302596">Wikipedia</a>. The text is available under <a class="external text" href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en">Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0</a> unless otherwise noted. Additional terms may apply for the media files.

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